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Abstract
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ity. It first addresses the different levels of Internet “governance by infrastructure” in Russia, then focuses on the different
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of infrastructure are reconfiguring the geopolitics of the Russian Internet.
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1. Introduction
The last two decades of Russian Internet (RuNet)’s
development have showed a paradoxical situation
where a rapidly developing1 Internet coexisted with a
state-centered Internet governance. A “half-freedom of
speech” (Gelman, 2010) was associated with the hope
of a democratization of the country (Elting et al., 2010;
Lonkila, 2012). However, after the defeat of the protest
movement “For Fair Elections” (2011–2012), these
democratic expectations were questioned. The Krem-
lin started seeing the Internet “as politically disruptive
because it enables citizens to circumvent government-
controlled ‘traditional’ media” (Nocetti, 2015, p. 113).
Recent developments in RuNet regulation demon-
strate the government’s will to establish national con-
trol of the digital sphere (Freiberg, 2014; Nocetti, 2015).
The presidential administration organized an “Internet
+ Sovereignty” forum in May 2016 around issues of na-
tional governance of the Internet of Things (IoT) and
Big Data, promoting a project of Russian standards and
the possibility of building a closed national network in
the field of IoT. The intention to develop a “sovereign
Internet” was also proposed as a double response to
the terrorist threat and the domination of American
web services.
However, the laws that frame online activities of
Russian users are diverse and constantly evolving as
a patchwork of incomplete measures that overlap and
sometimes contradict each other. Each of these mea-
sures challenges IT professionals, e.g. Internet ser-
vice providers, hosting providers, developers, journalists,
bloggers and NGOs. Simultaneously, a set of individual
practices, know-how, or arts de faire, is being developed
by RuNet users to bypass access restrictions or protect
their communications from governmental surveillance.
1 75% of population are said to have Internet access in 2016.
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Emerging NGOs and associations promote and institu-
tionalize someof these hacks and launch large-scale cam-
paigns for RuNet freedom.
In light of this context, the central research aim of
this paper is to understand the connection between the
“State-centered” style of Russian Internet governance
and the local tactics of détournement and bricolage
(Akrich, 1998). Our hypothesis is that in the Russian case,
resistance to Internet control and surveillance happens
not only and not primarily at the political and legal levels
(e.g. lobbying or negotiations with governmental struc-
tures, class action or collective mobilizations) but at the
level of everyday individual practices of usage, such as
anonymization of users or migration of people and in-
frastructures. A specific body of research dedicated to lo-
cal social movements in contemporary Russia (Erpyleva
&Magun, 2014; Kharkhordin, 2011; Prozorov, 2012; Zhu-
ravlev, Savelyeva, & Yerpylova, 2014) is helpful to analyze
this style of contention: indeed, this research analyzes
post-Soviet de-politicization as the consequence of an
“exodus” from the public sphere to the private sphere. It
shows that Russian civil society tends to mobilize around
local problems, often related to the materiality of the
city (Ceruzzi, 2006) rather than to support global chal-
lenges; for example, bottom-up activities of repair and
maintenance of a particular district or equipment in the
city will be favored over a protest against the Mayor of
the same city. In this sense, and along the lines of re-
cent scholarship such as Klyueva’s (2016), the article is
also an attempt to understand the specificities of the re-
sponse of Russian civil society—with its mix of collective
and individual tactics of resistance—to restrictive Inter-
net policies.
The structure of the paper is as follows. First, it ad-
dresses the different levels of Internet “governance by
infrastructure” (DeNardis & Musiani, 2016), in Russia—
showing how the Russian State is increasingly leveraging,
co-opting and on occasion “tampering with”, Internet in-
frastructure in order to fulfill political aims that, in some
instances, are sensibly different than the objectives the
infrastructure was originally meant for. Then, the paper
focuses on the different tactics of individual and collec-
tive resistance, and concludes with a discussion of how
the forms of control enacted at different levels of RuNet
infrastructure are reconfiguring its geopolitics.
The paper builds upon observations of “cryptopar-
ties”, on original interviews with Russian IT-specialists,
Internet service providers (ISPs) and expatriate journal-
ists and developers, and situates this material by means
of a brief analysis of Russian Internet legislation. More
specifically, the empirical part of the research combined
several methods: observation of three cryptoparties in
2012, 2015 and 2016—the purpose of these observa-
tions being to analyze different tools used in order to
protect anonymity and bypass censorship, as well as
the discourse organizers and participants were develop-
ing about Internet regulations in Russia; interviews with
3 internet service providers, 4 expatriated developers,
1 NGO organizer and a dozen users. The interviews were
semi-structured with grids adapted to providers, devel-
opers and users, and lasted between 40 minutes and 2
hours. Qualitative analyses of relevant press materials
andWeb ethnographies analyzing professional forums of
ISPs as well as the biggest Internet resources dedicated
to Internet Freedom in Russia (such as Moskovskiy Liber-
tarium or Rublacklist) were also conducted.
2. Surveillance, Data Storage and Filtering: Levels of
Infrastructure-Based Internet Control in Russia
RuNet governance has developed upon several layers,
with three main types of measures adopted since 1998:
a) Surveillance measures of ‘lawful interception’,
called System of Operative Investigative Measures
(SORM), aimed at giving governmental services
such as FSB (former KGB) access to private commu-
nications both by telephone and on the Internet;2
b) Regulation of data storage, restricting important
data flows to national borders;
c) Filtering measures, restricting access to a grow-
ing list of websites (blacklist)3 considered as ex-
tremist. These three layers are interconnected
and show a global tendency towards a RuNet
“balkanization”—hyper-localization and nation-
state regulation of data and communication flows.
2.1. “SORMisation” of Russia: Surveillance Measures
and ISP Markets
The SORM was first implemented in Russia in 1998.
SORM provides an architecture by which law enforce-
ment and intelligence agencies can obtain direct access
to data on commercial networks. During the past eight
years, SORM has given rise to new configurations of so-
ciotechnical “actants” (Latour, 1988) with long-term con-
sequences on the market of ISPs. Three generations of
SORMmeasures have seen the light. SORM-1 allows FSB
to access telephone traffic, including mobile networks.
SORM-2, implemented in 2005, is responsible for inter-
2 Apart from FSB and Roskomnadzor, MVD (Ministry of Internal Affairs), FSO (Federal Service of Security), FSKN (Federal Service for Control of Drug Traf-
fic), FTS (Federal Customs Service) and FSIN (Federal Penitentiary Service) also participate in online surveillance in Russia. However, whileMVD, FSB and
FSKN both possess the equipment and have the right to use it for lawful interception, FSO and FTS depend on FSB to have an access to the equipment,
while FSIN has the equipment but does not have the right to use it for investigative activities. Apart from state actors regulating online surveillance, a
market of surveillance equipment has been developing in recent years (especially since the adoption of SORM-3 measures). Several private companies
seem to play the most important role in this field: “Special technologies” and “MFI-Soft” (who earn 5–6 billion rubles a year on SORM equipment)
and smaller manufacturers (Reanet, Norsi-Trans and TechArgos each earning 1 billion rubles a year). The most recent player on the market is the State
corporation RosTech, supposed to produce the necessary equipment to implement Yarovaya law.
3 Officially called “Unified Register of Domain Names, Internet Website Page Locators, and Network Addresses that Allow to Identify Internet Websites
Containing Information Prohibited for Distribution in the Russian Federation” (or Unified Register).
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cepting IP traffic, including VoIP. SORM-3, implemented
in 2014, gathers information from all communicationme-
dia, and offers long-term and comprehensive storage of
subscriber data (Privacy International, 2016).
Compared to international Lawful Interception stan-
dards, SORMgives great autonomy to surveillance actors.
In most Western countries, law enforcement agencies
seek a warrant from a court and then issue an order for
lawful interception to a network operator or ISP, which
is obliged to intercept and deliver the requested informa-
tion. The FSB does not need to contact the ISP because
of the very architecture of SORM, containing twomain el-
ements: the “extractor” (the equipment—software and
hardware—that performs data extraction) and the “re-
mote control station”. The control station is localized in
the FSB regional office and enables remote control of the
extractorwithout the provider’s permission: the provider
may not know which data, and how, is intercepted, ana-
lyzed and transferred. No court decision is necessary in
order to activate the interception of the metadata. How-
ever, in order to access the actual telephone recordings,
FSB has to ask for a court permission. In 2012, therewere
372,144 orders distributed, according to the official data
provided by the Supreme Court.4
The most expensive component of SORM is the cir-
cular buffer for data storage. However, each new gener-
ation of SORM measures has changed the technical re-
quirements: while for SORM-2 providers needed to store
all the traffic for 12 hours, SORM-3 obliged them to store
all themetadata for three years. Thus, the providers have
to change all their equipment as the implementation of
SORM systems completely relies on them: “We pay for
it”, remarks internet provider Michael I. “If you do not
put this equipment, you do not have license and you lose
state clients”.
When the local FSB or prosecutor’s office identifies
shortcomings, they send the information to Roskomnad-
zor (the Federal Service for Supervision of Communica-
tions, Information Technology andMassMedia).5 The ISP
is warned, first fined, then if violations persist, its license
may be revoked (Borogan& Soldatov, 2013). Roskomnad-
zor statistics show that in 2010, there were 16 warnings,
13 in 2011, and 30 in 2012.6
Providers have to renew SORM equipment by them-
selves as no certified standards exist on the market and
there is no consensus among manufacturers. As a re-
sult, providers have to adapt to the new technical de-
mands, sometimes via DIY tinkering with old equipment:
“Adapt the parts of your system, first of all…because
when they will finally publish the certificates…we will
have to spend tons of bucks again, and we will have to
do it, because that’s the Law”,7 notes user Andrei on 14
November 2015.
An inquiry led by Leonid Volkov, activist, blogger and
programmer, claims that “a small provider has to give
about 20%–30% of his annual income to buy SORMequip-
ment” (Volkov, 2016). The two biggest manufacturers of
SORM equipment earn 5–6 billion rubles per year on
SORM, while three other small manufacturers earn about
1 billion. To reduce their costs, smaller providers buy
SORM-as-a-service from their upstreamproviders. The im-
plementation of SORM-1 in Russia sparked a protest cam-
paign by IT-professionals, human rights organizations and
Internet freedom defenders. The first anti-SORM move-
ment was launched in the late 1990s in the form of
a DDoS attack on FSB semantic analysis tools. Activists
were adding specific keywords to every mail, such as
“bomb”, “explosion”, “terrorist attack”, triggering constant
alerts to the control station and overloading it. Moscov-
skiy Libertarium,8 with Russian and international partners,
launched an international solidarity campaign against
SORM. A public petition was sent to the Supreme Court
and former Russian president Boris Yeltsin, asking him to
“use his authority in order to stop the implementation of
SORM”, an “unprecedented example of violation of the
rights to privacy and human rights convention”.9 While
this campaign did not produce immediate results, fifteen
years later the European Court of HumanRights has recog-
nized that SORMwas a violation to the European Conven-
tion of Human Rights, because its technical infrastructure
enabled interception of communications without court
permission, thus bypassing legal procedures.
The early-2000s anti-SORM campaign wasmostly led
by journalists, NGO activists and programmers, while
providers were almost absent from the controversy, with
the exception of “Bayard-Slaviya Communications”. As
Sergey Smirnov, activist of Pravozashitnaya Set (Human
Rights Network), notes: “Internet service providers have
come to the conclusion that the perspective to lose their
license is much worse than the necessity to collabo-
rate with FSB. In one of the recent publications about
SORM, an FSB officer noticed that in themajority of cases
providers apply all the requirements without any pres-
sure and even demonstrate an understanding”.10 The
4 According to the official statistics provided by the Supreme Court, in 2012, 372,144 orders were distributed, compared to 326,105 in 2011, 276,682 in
2010, 245,645 in 2009, 229,144 in 2008 and 189,591 in 2007: https://ria.ru/infografika/20130815/956535235.html
5 Roskomnadzor is a Federal Executive Authority of the Russian Federation, performing the following functions: control and supervision of mass media
(including electronic mass media), mass communications, information technology, and telecommunications; supervision and statutory compliance con-
trol of personal data processing; managing the Radio Frequency Service activities; supervision of production of copies of audiovisual works, computer
software, databases and audio recordings on any media; accreditation of experts and expert organizations for content evaluation in order to ensure
child information security. It is affiliated to the Ministry of Communications and Mass Media of the Russian Federation. The role of Roskomnadzor has
recently expanded. The list of all its functions may be found on its official website: http://eng.rkn.gov.ru/about
6 Available at https://rkn.gov.ru/press/annual_reports
7 Available at http://forum.nag.ru/forum/index.php?showtopic=47641&st=560
8 Available at http://www.libertarium.ru, created by Anatoliy Leventchuk in 1994.
9 Available at http://www.libertarium.ru/l_sormact_gilc
10 Available at http://www.libertarium.ru/l_sormact_conf6aprd
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lack of providers in the anti-SORM movement made any
civil disobedience movement technically impossible. In
order to create a precedent, Leonid Volkov launched a
campaign against SORM-3 in 2015; he started the so-
called “Attack on SORM”, a legal and political project of
collective appeal to court by operators and providers, to
demand better regulation of SORMand state-funded cer-
tified equipment.
2.1.1. Yarovaya Law: When Law (Unusually) Pre-Dates
Technology
Nonetheless, the development of SORM legal and techni-
cal requirements created tensions in the ISP community.
In June 2016, a new set of surveillancemeasureswas pro-
posed by Representative Irina Yarovaya: Russian telecom
operators will have to store all traffic (including calls, let-
ters, documents, images and video) for six months, and
related metadata for three years. The importance of this
case lies in its revealing a “reverse gap” between legal
measures and financial and technical resources: while
“governments are struggling to keep up with the pace
of technological change, with technology evolving faster
than law-making efforts” (Nocetti, 2015, p. 111), in the
Yarovaya law case, law-making has outpaced the actual
technological development of the country. Indeed, such
surveillance needs a complex and multilayered techni-
cal infrastructure (including servers, the network itself,
data storage systems and software), with far-reaching
implications for the ways Internet and telecommunica-
tions work in Russia, including quality of connection,
the speed at which and the amounts of data the net-
work is able to transfer and the price of Internet ser-
vices. Vladimir K., ISP, says: “Yarovaya law is technically
absurd. Firstly, there is no necessary equipment on the
market. Secondly, it is useless to store encrypted data.
With the same success, we can code a random numbers
generator and send this data to FSB pretending it is our
users’ traffic”.
The problem is both technical and geopolitical, as it
questions the limits of the Russian nation-state and its
capabilities to implement a new infrastructure indepen-
dently from the Western market. Within embargo, due
to the Western sanctions imposed on Russia following
the annexation of Crimea in 2014, the Russian govern-
ment turns to national companies to produce the nec-
essary equipment. The politics of “substitution of im-
ports” coupled with the new series of surveillance laws
have an important impact on the Russian IT-industry. The
CEO of MGTS (Moscow State Telecom Network), Andrey
Ershov, states: “Today we do not have any equipment
in order to be able to put the ‘Yarovaya law’ into prac-
tice….So, the biggest concern that all telecom operators
publicly express, is related to the cost of such solutions.
[The equipment] is about tens of billion rubles”. Even the
emerging set of firms specialized in SORM equipment
cannot satisfy Yarovaya law requirements in terms of
equipment, estimated at 10.3 billion rubles (Kantyshev,
2016). Providers and telecom operators have publicly
expressed their skepticism of the new surveillance law,
pointing out that new solutions risk becoming obsolete
within a few years and will demand further investment
(Schepin, 2016). Press and specialized websites show a
rise in disapproval of the Yarovaya law among IT profes-
sionals, for similar reasons. Among the actors criticizing
the law are the biggest Russian IT companies, Mail.ru
and Yandex, as well as professional associations Russian
Association of Electronic Communications and Russian
Civic Organization Center for Informational Technologies
and even a pro-governmental working group “Communi-
cations and IT” (“Svyaz i IT”). The most popular profes-
sional forum of Russian providers, Nag.ru, creatively re-
acted to the law by developing a “Yarculator”11, a soft-
ware enabling providers to calculate the prices for the
necessary equipment and the cost of Internet services
for end users.
The law was largely contested by civil society. A peti-
tion on Change.org gathered 623,465 signatures as of 8
January 2017. A demonstration against the law was held
in Moscow in August 2016 and gathered between 2,400
to 4,000 people (Kozlov & Filipenok, 2016). On his end,
Edward Snowden publicly asked Putin not to sign the
Yarovaya law, emphasizing its nefarious economic con-
sequences and pointing out that a six-month storage of
data is dangerous, unfeasible and expensive12 (Figures 1
and 2).
Figure 1. Edward Snowden’s critical tweet on the Yarovaya law.
11 Available at http://nag.ru/articles/article/29513/-yarkulyator-kalkulyator-yarovoy.html#comments
12 Available at http://www.macdigger.ru/iphone-ipod/snouden-raskritikoval-zakon-yarovoj-on-otnimet-u-rossiyan-dengi-i-svobodu.html
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Figure 2. Edward Snowden’s critical tweet on the duration of data storage outlined in the Yarovaya law.
While SORMand Yarovaya law give FSB access to data
stored on Russian servers without informing site owners
or providers, it is more difficult to get access to foreign
services, e.g. Facebook and Twitter. Thus, a set of new
measures has been adopted to reconfigure data storage
and transfer.
2.2. “Snowden Effect” on RuNet: Migrations of Personal
Data
Snowden’s revelations had a considerable effect on IT
markets. The leaks “changed the way people perceive
their personal data, and will cost internet corporations,
especially American ones, millions of dollars” (Filonov,
2014). Indeed, in January 2014, Canadian provider Peer1
showed that 75 British and Canadian companies did
not want to store their data in the US because of the
fear of being tracked down by the surveillance ser-
vices.13 Internet companies started creating servers out-
side US territory.
Russian Internet users—particularly specific groups
including developers and activists—were seemingly not
caught unprepared by Snowden’s revelations. SORM be-
ing well-known since the late 1990s to all active Inter-
net users, it was not news for Russians that govern-
ments could track their communications without a court
order. Maxim I., hosting provider with Komtet, notes:
“His revelations were not a surprise for specialists….In
Russia, and I am sure, in any country, it is possible to
get whatever information about a user or his websites.
Some RuNet users even joked about the role Snowden
played in RuNet regulation: ‘Why have they kept Snow-
den here?’ Very simple. They just asked him about the
downsides of the American system of surveillance and
made a better one”.14
Snowden’s revelations attracted attention to exist-
ing surveillance practices and made it possible to com-
pare SORM with the US system. However, the revela-
tions’ most important impact concerned the role of US
cloud services and internet corporations. In response,
the Russian government modified the “Law on storage
and protection of personal data” and reconsidered data
geopolitics to allegedly guarantee the “protection of Rus-
sian citizens’ data from US government surveillance”.
Researcher-journalists Andrei Soldatov and Irina Boro-
gan insist on the role that Snowden played in this: “Right
on time, Edward Snowden appeared on the world stage.
The NSA scandal made a perfect excuse for Russian au-
thorities to launch a campaign to bring global web plat-
forms such as Gmail and Facebook under Russian law—
either requiring them to be accessible in Russia by the
domain extension .ru, or obliging them to be hosted on
Russian territory” (Borogan & Soldatov, 2013).
The law #242-FZ was adopted on 1 September 2014.
It obliges providers to “store personal data of Rus-
sian citizens, used by internet services, on the terri-
tory of the Russian Federation”. Providers must guar-
antee recording, systematization, accumulation, storage,
updates, modifications and extraction of personal data
using databases located on Russian territory.15 Non-
compliance with this new law may result in total block-
age of the service. Thus, for example, in November 2016
LinkedIn was blocked in Russia (including mobile apps)
for the violation of the new data storage policies. Web
services are also required to build backdoors for Rus-
sian secret services to access stored data. Another way
to put pressure on western companies is to block en-
tire web services because they store “forbidden informa-
tion”. Thus, YouTube was blocked in Russia for hosting
a video judged as extremist. Facebook removed a page
called Club Suicide rather than seeing its entire network
blacklisted. The repatriation of data illustrates the ten-
dency of Russian internet governance towards “digital
sovereignty” (Nocetti, 2015, p. 112).
Several resistance tactics have developed in response
to these balkanizationmeasures. A petition addressed to
Google, Facebook and Twitter asks them not to oblige:
“We don’t trust the domestic security services that are in
charge of data security once the data is in Russia. We’re
asking internet companies to withstand this pressure us-
ing all possible legal means and we are ready to sup-
port them”.16 Developers were immediately concerned,
as the law attacked the instruments theywere constantly
using, such as GitHub, as well as their data storage prac-
tices. Another tactic deployed was a reorientation to-
wards newproducts thatwould avoid storage of personal
13 Available at http://go.peer1.com/rs/peer1/images/Peer1-Report-NSA-Survey-NA.pdf
14 Available at http://www.yaplakal.com/forum1/st/75/topic1086610.html
15 Available at http://www.garant.ru/news/648095/#ixzz4LqmT7iT8
16 Available at https://www.change.org/p/facebook-google-twitter-don-t-move-personal-data-to-russia
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data: “We try to make services that do not store user
data, so that we do not have to store it on our servers”,
remarks Alexey P., developer, CTO of Progress Engine;
“We have some apps that we make for TV, or for elec-
tronic wallets, where the data is stored on the servers of
our clients”. These are specific resistance tactics which
we could call tactics of “evasion”. In fact, instead of con-
testing the law #242-FZ by communicating directly with
the Russian government, citizens either try to communi-
cate with western IT companies (addressing petitions to
Google and Facebook), ormodify their ownpractices and
professional activities in order to find legal gaps or grey
zones (e.g. using APIs for authorization or third parties
for user data storage, or repositioning their product in
order to use no personal data at all).
Another step towards digital sovereignty was made
in spring 2016 with an ambitious project of “state-in-
the-middle”: during the forum “IT + Sovereignty”, the in-
tended creation of state-owned SSL-certification was an-
nounced. Forum member Natalya Kasperskaya explains:
“Roskomnadzor and FSB are lobbying the delegation of
SSL certificates to governmental organizations….Nowwe
have a piece of the Internet that is completely out of con-
trol by our own country, and it is not good. Because the
data is being gathered globally, by someone who is be-
yond the borders of our state, and it is totally wrong”.17
According to our interviewees, this project is actually a
response to the inefficient Yarovaya law and the grow-
ing popularity of encryption among RuNet users. Alexey
P. emphasizes: “They understood that storing gigabytes
of data will give no results, especially because it is en-
crypted….So the project to build a Man-in-the-middle at-
tack on the governmental level is scary”.
2.3. Error 451: Filtering Websites, Restricting Access to
the Content
HTTP/1.1 451 Unavailable For Legal Reasons
<h1>Unavailable For Legal Reasons</h1>
<p>This request may not be serviced in the
Roman Province of Judea due to the Lex Julia
Majestatis, which disallows access to
resources hosted on servers deemed to be
operated by the People's Front of Judea.</p>
</body>
</html>18
A third set of measures, based on filtering, seeks to con-
trol user access to the content of websites judged as
extremist or criminal. Since 2007, regional prosecutors
have implemented court decisions requiring ISPs to block
access to banned sites accused of extremism, but this
has not been done systematically. In order to central-
ize these different materials, a “Single register of Inter-
net resources containing information whose distribution
is forbidden in Russia” was created in 2012: any web-
sites that enter this blacklist have to be blocked and
three governmental agencies participate in the constitu-
tion of this blacklist. Since the adoption of the “Lugovoy
law” on 1 February 2014, the list includes websites that
“appeal to extremism”, e.g. mass disorders, religious or
interethnic discord, participation in terrorist attacks or
some types of public mass events.
On 13 March 2014, Roskomnadzor blocked access
to four webpages: Grani.ru (a liberal online media plat-
form), Kasparov.ru (the website of Garry Kasparov, chess-
player and a leader of the liberal opposition), Ezhed-
nevniy Zhurnal (liberal media platform) and the blog of
Alexey Navalny (anti-Putin movement leader in 2011–
2012 and reputable blogger). Roskomnadzor stated that
“these websites contain appeals to illegal activities and
participation in mass demonstrations that violate the
law”.19
The list of forbidden webpages is accessible online.20
As of 30 September 2016, 41,064 pages—mostly con-
cerning prostitution, gambling, black markets, gaming
and torrents—are blocked. However, NGO websites are
also present, such as the site of Mirotvorets,21 a pro-
Ukrainian organization that informs about the conflict in
Ukraine, in particular on the location of Russian troops.
The blocking happens in three ways: by DNS, by IP
address or by URL, using Deep Packet Inspection. Admin-
istratively, hosting providers are responsible for keep-
ing the blacklist up-to-date and communicating with the
owners of forbidden sites and end-users. Maxim I. notes
that “The blocking is very easy. We receive and update
regularly the black list, twice in a day, and we block those
of our clients who are not lucky….We inform our client
that his site has been added to the blacklist. Then we
listen to everything that the client wants to say about
Roskomnadzor but we can’t help them or ignore the de-
mand of Roskomnadzor because in this case they can
block the IP address of the server, or even an address
pool. I am not even speaking about administrative con-
sequences for the company”.
While providers have very little possibility to resist
the blocking of the blacklisted resources, they choose
other forms of action to express their critique of Inter-
net censorship. Vladimir K., director of the ISP CLN, says:
“When users try to access to a blocked page, we show
them the error message that starts with a phrase: “The
struggle against evil is almost never a struggle for good”.
Thus, the error message itself becomes a space of ex-
pression where providers can symbolically communicate
with their users by showing their attitude towards the
Lugovoy law.
However, Russian filtering and blocking systems are
applied unevenly from one region to another, from one
17 Available at https://rublacklist.net/21509
18 Available at https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7725
19 Available at http://www.newsru.com/russia/13mar2014/block.html
20 Available at https://reestr.rublacklist.net
21 Available at www.myrotvorets.center
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provider to another. For example, several employees
of ISPs of big companies/monopolists, such as Russian
Railways, confirm that they have not been blocked, as
Dmitry M. in 2014: “We have this provider in our com-
pany, and all the blacklisted websites can be opened.
However this seems quite logical, because Roskomnad-
zor can’t give any orders to Russian Railways, who own
this provider” (Nossik, 2014). Also, filtering works only
partially, depending on the region, the provider and its
position on the market, its connections with western
providers (e.g. providers who had a peering agreement
with Stockholm could access blacklisted websites).
The paradox of filtering consists in the double digi-
tal divide that it creates. The more “politicized” users,
familiar with the forbidden online resources, will keep
on accessing them, using specific tools to bypass cen-
sorship. However, the majority of the population will
be unable to access this content, lacking the necessary
knowledge, resources and technologies to do so. Search
engines are also impacted by filtering, so reinforcing
the divide: before the blockage, users could accidentally
discover some websites (e.g. Navalny’s blog) through
search engines, but after the blockage these sites “dis-
appeared” (were dereferenced) from the search results.
This consequently reduces considerably any potential
audience and reinforces the echo-chamber effect by re-
grouping userswho already agree, asmentioned by user
popados: “These blockages are not for those who read
and will bypass no matter how. It is for random visi-
tors that come from the search or other casual chan-
nels that actually constitute the majority. They will just
go to another website. In this sense, the blockage is
rather efficient” (Nossik, 2014). The same phenomenon
touches blacklisted torrent websites, such as Rutracker,
that demonstrate a significant decrease in traffic: “the
majority of users are just lazy, they are finding newopen
sources of content. So the goal of the filtering is not
to close for everyone, but for an important part”, says
Maxim I.
Still, access restrictions are not especially difficult to
bypass. The IETF notes that “inmany cases clients can still
access the denied resource by using technical counter-
measures such as a VPN or the Tor network” (RFC 7725).
Indeed, users deploy manifold technical practices, brico-
lages and arts de faire.
3. Elusive Users: Countermeasures for Bypass and
Anonymity
“Long ago, when GSM connection was not very high
quality, there was a trick: you just need to say ‘bomb,
president, terrorism’ and the connection would
become much better” Fedor, ISP
Users recently gathered in associations to denounce
RuNet censorship and surveillance and promote counter-
measures: these include but are not limited to the Rus-
sian Pirate Party, Roskomsvoboda (Association for the
Freedom of Communications), a website for monitor-
ing and analytics of the blockages (Rublacklist), and the
project Openrunet promoting countermeasures. While
some of these are focused on political campaigning
against access restrictions, others concentrate on pro-
moting countermeasures and do not focus on the gov-
ernment but on RuNet users.
Different resistance tactics circulate on forums, blog-
ging platforms and social networks, in the form of
comments, posts or specific tutorials. Dedicated “of-
fline”workshops, called “cryptoparties”, are organized to
present privacy-enhancing tools, and draw from an inter-
national cryptoparty movement launched in 2012. Pre-
Snowden, in 2012, we participated in such workshops in
Saint-Petersburg. They were aimed at left activists (anar-
chists and antifascists). After 2013, seminars were aimed
at a wider audience including NGO workers, journalists,
rights defenders and RuNet users seeking to adapt their
habits to new realities. The event namewas also adapted,
the marked word “cryptoparty” being replaced by “sem-
inars on information security”.
A wide range of bypass and anonymization tactics
and tools exist, circulating both on the Web and during
thematic seminars. The organizers themselves attempt
to classify existing tools and practices, to build tutorials
and construct a coherent presentation, for which several
strategies have been observed. Classification occurred,
for example, based on the question “Who is your en-
emy?” Thus Igor, moderator of a cryptoparty for an au-
dience of NGO workers in April 2016, Saint-Petersburg,
constructed his presentation around two “big enemies”:
the state and corporations. He presented the tools that
can help bypass state censorship and some devices that
would help resist targeted advertising and data tracking.
A different format was observed in the Roskomsvoboda
tutorials, which organizematerials according to the tasks
users want to perform: “access to a blocked website”,
“communicate in privacy”, “protect your metadata while
surfing the web”.
On our end, we distinguish such practices here ac-
cording to the laws they intend to challenge, whether it
is SORM or filtering practices and access to blacklisted
content. Some of the tools are used in both cases.
As SORM is aimed at intercepting communications,
bypassing techniques consist in encrypting them. En-
cryption tools are used at both the application and net-
work layers. At the application layer, cryptography has
been promoted since the first campaigns against SORM
launched in 1998 by Moscovskiy Libertarium.22 Back
then, activists were promoting PGP or GnuPG over a
mail client, all the while understanding the limits of cryp-
tography: “These countermeasures can’t exclude the
possibility to intercept your communications, but our
goal is to make this access extremely hard and expen-
sive” (Otstavnov, 1998, our emphasis). Moskovskiy Lib-
ertarium was promoting massive usage of these tools
22 Available at http://www.libertarium.ru/sorm_crypto_esc
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as collective action to make surveillance hard and eco-
nomically disadvantageous for the state: “If the Inter-
net community used these technical means at least
in half of the cases, it would become almost immu-
nized against all these dirty tricks such as SORM. How-
ever, even occasional usage of strong crypto (espe-
cially for fun) will make our opponents’ work very hard”
(Otstavnov, 1998).
Nowadays, usage of PGP has increased,while remain-
ing far from the ambitious goal of 50% or 100% of users;
however, mobile apps for encrypted messaging are gain-
ing popularity. The market for encrypted messaging and
mailing clients being in expansion (Ermoshina, Musiani,
& Halpin, 2016), cryptoparty organizers and specialized
NGOs (e.g. Roskomsvoboda) elaborate several sets of cri-
teria to rate and compare the apps. For example, Igor,
the moderator mentioned above, presented a set of cri-
teria including open source, end-to-end, group chat and
calls, synchronization between devices, self-destroying
messages, notifications about logins from different de-
vices, logging history and multi-layered authentication.
For the time being, alongside WhatsApp,23 Telegram
remains the most popular secure messaging app among
Russian users. The usage of Telegram varies according
to users’ goals and threat models. Several functionalities
of the app make it convenient for different user groups:
chats, secret chats, group chats, bots and channel broad-
casting. Users faced with a low level of threat, not as-
sociated with any political activities, tend to adopt Tele-
gram as an alternative to WhatsApp and SMS for ev-
eryday conversations with their peer groups. Many ac-
tivists and privacy-concerned users are aware of the ab-
sence of “privacy by default” in Telegram chats (client-
to-server encryption) and opt for a “secret chat” op-
tion that offers end-to-end encryption. This user group
also adopts two-step authentication and self-destruct
timer options. Functions such as “Group chat” are used
for group conversations between up to 200 users and
are popular among activists, journalists or researchers
for organizational purposes, as an alternative to Google
Groups or mailing lists. For example, one of our use-
cases, a group of researchers working in Eastern Ukraine,
use Telegram on a daily basis to coordinate research ac-
tivities, discuss fieldwork, materials and other organiza-
tional information. However, they do not rely on Tele-
gram for very sensitive discussions and prefer face-to-
face offline meetings.
The popularity of Telegram in Russia can be partly
explained by the reputation of its founders, Nico-
lai and Pavel Durov, Russian-born developers and en-
trepreneurs. Pavel Durov, the founder of Vkontakte, the
most famous Russian social network, is colloquially re-
ferred to as the “Russian Zuckerberg” and became per-
sona non grata in Russia after his refusal to collaborate
with the FSB.24 Telegram’s quick rise on the market of
messaging apps is of particular interest as it tells us a lot
about the socio-economic factors that influence the suc-
cess of an innovation in the field: it was when Facebook
bought WhatsApp (followed by a several hours black-
out for the latter), that the Telegram download rate ex-
ploded. As opposed to WhatsApp, Telegram can pub-
licly underline its non-for-profit character and lack of ties
with any commercial or governmental services.
While the Russian version of Telegram was released
in 2012, before the Snowden revelations, Durov claims
that the international version of his tool was inspired by
the whistleblower: “In 2012 my brother and I built an en-
cryptedmessaging app for our personal use—wewanted
to be able to securely pass on information to each other,
in an environment where WhatsApp and other tools
were easily monitored by the authorities. After Edward
Snowden’s revelations in 2013 we understood the prob-
lem was not unique to our situation and existed in other
countries. So we released the encrypted messaging app
for the general public”.25
As Telegram servers are located in five different coun-
tries around the world, outside Russia, its broadcast-
ing function is used by censored media as a way to by-
pass the blockage, and by bloggers as an alternative to
Facebook and traditional blogging platforms (for exam-
ple, Alexey Navalny’s popular bot on Telegram and the
Grani.ru channel and bot, amongst others). However, un-
like private communications on Telegram, public chan-
nels may be read and blocked by ISPs and by the Tele-
gram technical team. As of January 2016, 660 channels
attributed to ISIS were blocked.
While the “broadcasting channel” function made
Telegram an alternative to other news sources and so-
cial networks, political activists prefer either the “secret
chat” function, or Signal. The Signal application, which
Snowden recommended, is used for a specific and lim-
ited set of functions—SMS and phonecalls. However, at
recent cryptoparties Signal has been criticized for the
absence of functions such as automatic synchronization
among different devices, time-settings and search.
The technologies used to bypass the Lugovoy law and
access censored websites mostly employ the practice of
IP address-switching. Therefore one of the most popu-
lar and easy-to-use tools is an online proxy server,such
as hideme.ru or cameleo.ru. However, this system was
criticized by our IT-security activist interviewees for its
lack of traffic encryption: a proxy is only useful for by-
23 Wedo not examineWhatsApp here, as it was not initially designed as a securemessaging appwith end-to-end encryption. Our research and interviews
with developers of secure messaging apps (especially with Peter Sunde from Heml.is, who had been contacted by WhatsApp before they decided to
purchase the Signal protocol) also show that WhatsApp’s motivation to adopt encryption was a market-driven choice, not an ideological decision. Even
though the consequences of WhatsApp’s decision are very important for the overall “passive” adoption of encryption in Russia, what interests us in
this paper is the deliberate and intentional choice of a secure tool. We also do not have data measuring the explicit adoption of WhatsApp consequent
of its turn to end-to-end encryption.
24 Available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUS74722569420130830
25 http://www.dazeddigital.com/artsandculture/article/24279/1/pavel-durov
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passing the blockage to access content from a black-
listed website, but it does not hide the content that a
user is reading. Users are also creatively adapting exist-
ing tools to achieve the bypassing goal. For instance, Rus-
sians actively use Net archives (archives.org, archive.is
or cached versions of websites stored by Google), or ac-
tivate the “turbo” mode in Opera or Yandex browsers,
enabling a very high speed of data transfer. However,
once again these tools merely give access to the blocked
page, but do not guarantee any anonymity. Moreover,
in November 2016, Roskomnadzor started negotiations
with Opera representatives about the possibility of block-
ing access to forbidden content even in “turbo”mode. As
of January 2017 no agreement has yet been reached, due
to Opera having recently been sold to Golden Brick Capi-
tal, a Chinese investment consortium.
As users can be tracked and eventually persecuted
for their search of forbiddenmaterials, a set of anonymiz-
ing network-layer tools is promoted through cryptopar-
ties and online tutorials, starting with Tor. However, this
popular tool is increasingly criticized. Snowden’s reve-
lations proved the importance of metadata protection
and exposed the vulnerability of Tor. While seminars
on informational security observed before 2013 in Saint-
Petersburg were promoting widespread use of Tor with
almost no attendant criticisms, more recent observa-
tions (2015 and 2016) show a growing skepticism and
loss of trust. Igor explained the vulnerability of Tor at
a workshop organized by Teplitsa Sotsialnih Technologiy:
“First of all, your internet service provider will see that
you use Tor. That gives him, and the people behind him,
a reason to be attentive to you: who is this person who
is constantly using Tor? Snowden said that the NSA is
tracking everybody who uses Tor, automatically. There
are only 7,000 exit nodes in the Tor network, it is not that
complicated to track them all”.
Another type of network layer tools is a Virtual Pri-
vate Network (VPN), which adds a supplementary layer
of traffic protection. Some of our interviewees pointed
out that VPN usage “has become a norm” for them
after the GitHub blocking incident in Russia. Among
the trusted VPN plugins, activists prefer “zenmate”26
and “tunnelbear”,27 as they do not need to access user
data, while other apps demand the right to access the
memory card, photos and contacts. Another popular
VPN is offered by Riseup.net,28 which has a good rep-
utation among politically engaged users (“done by ac-
tivists for activists”). However, along the lines of Ethan
Zuckerman’s “cute cat theory of digital activism” (2008),
users point out that activist-oriented tools are more
vulnerable to targeted attacks than are general public-
oriented tools.
Snowden’s revelations had a pedagogical effect on
Russian activist communities: during observed cryp-
toparties they were repeatedly heard to emphasize the
global character of the surveillance phenomenon. Infor-
mation security advocates insisted on the necessity for
users to change their whole “lifestyle”, including interac-
tion with different devices and publishing on social net-
works. Igor remarks: “You can encrypt your traffic as you
wish, you can hide, but if you go to Vkontakte and pub-
lish your photo, or talk about revolution, you must un-
derstand that it is extremely easy to de-anonymize you
and track your network of friends. So start by using your
brains, before using Tor and VPN”. Thus, after Snowden
revealed the interests of big corporations in collecting
user-generated data, cryptoparties began to focus not
only on activist use cases but on everyday life habits, “un-
boxing” mobile devices and laptops to demonstrate cus-
tomization of privacy settings.
On their end, activists are learning how to program
message self-destruction or deactivate the tracking of
search history and location. Encryption of mobile de-
vices and usage of pass-paragraphs and double or triple
authentication methods (combining fingerprints, pass-
word and a figure) are becoming popular alongside the
use of anonymous search engines such as StartPage or
DuckDuckGo, adblocking plugins and cookie controls. Ac-
tivists advocate multilayered protection and encryption
by combining virtual machines, VPN, TOR and encrypted
mail and messaging clients.
Finally, Snowden’s revelations on NSA surveillance
enabled a comparison of the Russian SORM and US in-
telligence strategies, showing common points and im-
portant differences between the two surveillance sys-
tems. Activists describe the Russian system as less effi-
cient than its US counterpart, pointing to the geopolitical
reasons behind this gap. Not only is Russian surveillance
less effective, but the diplomatic context and IT-market
configuration alsomake it harder for Russian surveillance
services to be as omnipresent as US ones. Yuriy, an ac-
tivist, developer and participant in the April 2016 work-
shop, notes: “As we now know from Edward Snowden’s
leaks, Americans have their own kind of SORM deployed
by the NSA. But it is much more expanded than SORM,
it has lots of subdivisions, some of them really crack
servers, someothers do cryptoanalytics. Snowden claims
American services have managed to somehow survey
even the Tor traffic, by taking control over the exit nodes.
But well…I am really not sure whether it is possible for
Russian services to control exit nodes, because some-
times they are located, I don’t know, in Panama. And
the NSA has much more power to control exit nodes in
different countries than Russia. No one likes Russia, and
Russia likes no one. It is much more complicated for the
FSB to negotiate the access”. Therefore it is the contro-
versial position of Russia within the international politi-
cal arena that makes it harder to negotiate withWestern
companies to control the traffic of Russian citizens who
use anonymizers and Tor.
26 Available at https://zenmate.com
27 Available at https://www.tunnelbear.com
28 Available at https://riseup.net/en/vpn
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4. Migrating Servers (and People): A Geopolitical
Countermeasure
Due to this geopolitical aspect of RuNet governance, an-
other effective protection tactic is the physical migration
of servers and people. Indeed, the legal and technical
constraints of RuNet result not only in individual strate-
gies for bypassing and collective action and campaigning,
but also in a significant exodus of Web professionals, es-
pecially journalists of online media.
The emigration of Russian journalists is not new. In
theUSSR a significant number of journalists left the coun-
try as a result of political persecution (De Tinguy, 2004).
However, in the 2010s these exiles are paradoxical, be-
cause even if they leave the country they remain con-
nected to Russian cyberspace and actively contribute to
its development (Bronnikova, 2016).
Media websites Grani.ru and Meduza were shut
down by Roskomnadzor in 2014, making it extremely
hard for their editors and owners to survive economically.
Despite bypassing tools, their audience decreased. This
resulted in the migration of infrastructure and of some
journalists out of the Russian Federation. Yuliya Bere-
zovskaya, from Grani.ru, left for France, while Meduza
was dislocated to Riga. The cases of Grani.ru andMeduza
are interesting for reconsidering the notion of “brain
drain”. Indeed, the Internet connects migrant and non-
migrant populations in their transnational online engage-
ment (Diminescu, 2008; Nedelcu, 2010): online journal-
ists and bloggers expatriated in the European Union, the
US or Israel are not excluded from Russian political life
but remain important actors in the RuNet freedomquest.
For example, Meduza actively informs its readers about
recent updates in Russian Internet governance.
Such expatriation also takes shape in a diaspora of
infrastructures. In particular, what are called “mirrors”
of forbidden websites are created, using platforms such
as Amazon.29 An increasing number of NGOs and other
associations opt to transfer their hosting to outside of
Russia. As Maxim I., a hosting provider, observes: “Such
websites as Children 40430 or oppositional websites are
progressively transferred to foreign servers and start us-
ing non-Russian gTLDs (generic top-level domains, such
as .ORG). The reason for this is simple: without any court
decision your page or the entire website can be blocked,
sometimes even by mistake, as it happened with Google
or GitHub. I remember also a mass exodus of clients in
Belarus, after they have been obliged to work only in
Byelorussian data-centers”. The tactic of domain zonemi-
grationwas also adopted byGrani.ruwhichmoved to the
.org domain zone on 27 May 2016, two years after its
chief editor physically left Russia. Another tactic of “ex-
odus” concerns the kinds of platforms used to dissemi-
nate content: more and more of Russia’s liberal online
media are abandoning the traditional format of websites
or blogs in favor of social media pages or Telegram broad-
casting channels.
Interestingly, this exodus had begun even before the
“Law on Personal Data Storage”: Alexey Sidorenko, direc-
tor of the NGO Teplitsa Sotsialnih Technologiy,31 dates
the first wave of infrastructure migration back to 2010.
The secondwave of digital migration can be attributed to
the “Foreign Agent” law: Teplitsa itself had tomove from
Moscow to Warsaw after the clampdown on foreign aid
agencies. IT specialists have seldom been using Russian
data-centers because of their technical drawbacks: “Peo-
ple have been actively using western platforms, just be-
cause it is more useful and efficient”, says Russian-born,
Turkey-adopted developer Timofey. However, recent reg-
ulation of the Internet has modified the practices of de-
velopers and reconfigured the markets. Alexey, CTO of
Progress Engine, concludes: “If GitHub is closed, this will
enforce brain-drain. And it has already started, several
of my colleagues have left to Germany. Folks prefer to
work with foreign markets and foreign services. First of
all, it’s the quality of technological solutions. And also,
when you work with a western client, there’s a possibil-
ity tomove. If there’smore control from the government,
you have a chance to leave”.
5. Conclusions
As Edward Snowden is currently on (temporary) asylum
in Russia, numerous scholars and journalists insist on
the geopolitical significance of this act and emphasize
its importance within the global context of a “Cold War
2.0”. Yet, far from supporting Snowden’s fight for trans-
parency of government data and Internet users’ free-
dom, the Russian government is gradually centralizing
its surveillance over the RuNet. However, the direct and
indirect influence of the Snowden revelations is mak-
ing itself visible in a number of other ways, by expos-
ing censorship and surveillance at an unprecedented
scale and encouraging creative responses to it. This ar-
ticle has explored how, in response to growing censor-
ship, a variety of tactics are being developed and de-
ployed by Russian users and content producers, rang-
ing from infrastructure-based countermeasures and dé-
tournements to geopolitical reconfigurations involving
the migration of hardware and people.
Although it is not within the scope of this paper to
estimate the long-term impact of recent mobilizations
(as we do not have enough data to measure this), we
can conclude that Russian civic mobilization may be an-
alyzed at two levels. The first is public and collective,
for example the “anti-SORM” movement or petitions
against Yarovaya law. Such movements appear to have
limited impact beyond encouraging visibility and draw-
29 Reporters without Borders, having experimented this technique with Chinese bloggers, helped Russian blacklisted media to put it in practice. Thus,
mobilizations for RuNet freedom are integrated in transnational campaigns.
30 NGO defending the rights of LGBTQI-children.
31 Teplitsa Sotsialnih Technologiy is an NGO specialized in IT-education of social workers and activists and in development of collaboration between
Russian non-profit organizations and IT-specialists. Available at https://te-st.ru
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ing public attention to the problem, and even so they re-
main limited to a small section of the population (with
only around 600,000 signatures on Change.org and 2,000
people in attendance at the anti-Yarovaya law meeting),
namely IT professionals, journalists, bloggers and Inter-
net freedom activists. However, at the second level, that
of so-called “evasion” tactics, mobilisation is far more
successful: far from being a contentious means to criti-
cize government or affect changes in legislation and In-
ternet policy, these invisible or elusive techniques have
a direct and immediate impact on the everyday prac-
tices of users and IT professionals. Evasion techniques
are based on an ingenious and constantly changing set
of tools and arts de faire, and can help to access or
broadcast forbidden content as well as to continue IT-
related business.
This article shows that Russian Internet governance
increasingly takes shape as an “infrastructural battle”,
a dialectic between the government, who use and co-
opt infrastructure, and users, developers and providers
who hijack and reconfigure it, in a constant co-shaping
of law and technology. This speaks to the “turn to in-
frastructure” we have recently explored as an increas-
ing tendency in Internet governance (Musiani, Cogburn,
DeNardis, & Levinson, 2016). If the Snowden revelations
have constituted the ‘perfect excuse’ for the Russian gov-
ernment to try to enforce a radical approach of “digital
sovereignty” (Nocetti, 2015), they have also become on
the one hand a catalyst of freedom activists’ mobiliza-
tion, not only for “power users” but for the everyday situ-
ated practices of lambda users, and on the other hand an
opportunity for Russian businesses working with West-
ern companies to fight both from within and from out-
side the country. Moreover, the specific geopolitical and
economic conditions of embargo can be understood as
an important obstacle for Roskomnadzor. It is not civil
society but rather Russia’s lack of resources, infrastruc-
ture, expertise and technologies that make it impossible,
at least for now, to apply this law in practice. Despite the
current escalation of surveillance, could Russia’s contro-
versial position on the international chessboard turn into
a paradoxical opportunity for the RuNet?
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